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1
“Incident means any of the following events:
(1) An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline or of liquefied natural gas or
gas from an LNG facility and
(i) A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization; or 
(ii) Estimated property damage, including cost of gas lost, of the operator or others, or
both, of $50,000 or more.
(2) An event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility.
(3) An event that is significant, in the judgment of the operator, even though it did       not
meet the criteria of paragraphs (1) or (2).”  49 C.F.R. § 191.3.
2 NSTAR informed the Department that the property owner’s insurance carrier assessed the
structure at a value of $282,000.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope of This Investigation
The Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (“Department” or
“DTE”), pursuant to G.L. c. 164, § 105A and a Federal Certification Agreement as provided for
in 49 U.S.C. § 60105, has investigated a natural gas (“gas”) explosion (“incident”),1 that occurred
at approximately 1:41 a.m. on July 24, 2002.  The incident resulted in the death of two young
girls and extensive damage to the multi-family dwelling at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton
(“dwelling” or “structure”).  NSTAR Gas Company (“NSTAR” or “Operator”), the operator of
the distribution system, estimated the property damage to be between $300,000 and $400,0002
(Exh. 1).
Upon notice of an incident, the Department conducts an investigation to determine the
operator’s compliance with the Minimum Federal Safety Standards contained in 49 C.F.R. 
Part 192 and the Massachusetts pipeline safety regulations contained in 220 C.M.R. §§ 100-113. 
The Department also enforces the drug and alcohol testing requirements contained in 49 C.F.R.
Parts 40 and 199.  Subsequent to this incident, the operator did not drug test employees due to the
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exclusion in 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b), which states:
“Each operator shall conduct the following drug tests for the presence of a prohibited
drug:
. . . .
(b)  Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32 hours after an accident,
an operator shall drug test each employee whose performance either contributed to the
accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. An
operator may decide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision must be based on
the best information available immediately after the accident that the employee's
performance could not have contributed to the accident or that, because of the time
between that performance and the accident, it is not likely that a drug test would reveal
whether the performance was affected by drug use.”
49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b).  Because the last NSTAR service visits were to turn on gas and relight a
water heater on June 5, 2002, NSTAR has complied with 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b).  
The Department has established procedures for determining the nature and extent of
violations of regulations pertaining to the safety of pipeline facilities and the transportation of
gas.  These procedures also set forth the standards used to determine the amount of applicable
civil penalty.  The procedures are set forth in 220 C.M.R. §§ 69.01-69.12.  Concurrent with the
release of this report, the Department has issued a Notice of Probable Violation (“NOPV”) 
stating that the Department has reason to believe violations of state and federal pipeline safety
regulations may have occurred.  The issuance of the Incident Report and NOPV commences an
enforcement action as specified in 220 C.M.R. §§ 69.01-69.12.  An operator served with a
NOPV has a variety of response options.  The operator may:  (1) pay any proposed civil penalty;
(2) submit an offer in compromise; (3) request an informal conference; or (4) submit a written
reply disputing the alleged violations.  220 C.M.R. § 69.04.  In addition, an operator served with
a NOPV may request an adjudicatory hearing, 220 C.M.R. § 69.06, or enter into a consent order,
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3 This information was taken from the statements submitted to the Hopkinton Police by
many of the adult residents of the building (Exh. 2).
220 C.M.R. § 69.08.  If the Department finds, after an adjudicatory hearing, that the operator has
violated any provisions of any applicable codes, it may issue a remedial order.  220 C.M.R. §
69.07.         
As part of the Department’s annual certification process by the United States Department
of Transportation (“U.S. DOT”), the Department must report to U.S. DOT
“each accident or incident … involving a fatality, personal injury requiring
hospitalization, or property damage or loss of more than an amount the Secretary
establishes … any other accident the [Department] considers significant, and a summary
of the investigation by the [Department] of the cause and circumstances surrounding the
accident or incident.”
49 U.S.C. § 60105(c)(B).
This Incident Report is submitted to U.S. DOT in DTE’s fulfillment of this regulatory obligation
and to inform U.S. DOT, to the extent possible, of the cause and circumstances surrounding the
incident. 
B. Overview of the Incident
On the evening of July 23, 2002, eleven of the twelve residents of the four apartments at
65 Main Street, Hopkinton retired before midnight.3  Two members of the Webster Family,
residents of the first floor, and Mr. Maijs, a single resident on the upper level, awoke to a loud
sound coming from the basement (Exhs. 2a; 2b; 2c; 2d).  In an interview with a Department
investigator (“DTE Investigator”), Ms. Janet Webster described the sound as a loud motor which
she initially thought was a car outside, but then thought sounded as if it came from the basement
(Exh. 2a).  She said the sound woke her about five minutes before she called 911 on her cell
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phone (id.).  Ms. Webster noticed a strong odor of gas in the first floor hallway by the basement
door (Exh. 2b).  On the second floor, Mr. Maijs smelled a strong odor of gas near the pipe
entering his bathroom floor (Exh. 2c).  In addition, those residents who were awake prior to the
explosion described the sound as “similar to the malfunctioning sump pump” (Exh. 2b); “like a
tea kettle ready to burst” (Exh. 2d); “like the house was alive … vibration going through the
house … like someone was in the basement in a car and had the gas pinned to the floor” (Exh.
2e).  The Webster Family fled to their car and parked it across the street (Exh. 2b).  Ms. Webster
dialed 911 and while talking with the Hopkinton Fire Department (“Fire Department”) by cell
phone, the house exploded (id.).  The time was approximately 1:41 a.m. (Exh. 1).
Most residents were able to work their way out of the collapsed building; however, the
entire Carey Family, who resided on the second floor, was trapped.  Mr. Carey extracted himself
and his wife, but they were unable to free their children, two girls ages four and five (Exh. 2f). 
Rescue personnel recovered one of the Carey children and transported her to the hospital, where
she was later pronounced dead (Exh. 3).  The second Carey child was pronounced dead by a
paramedic who entered the rubble (Exh. 4).  The removal of the deceased victim required cutting
and removal of rubble which could not immediately be accomplished given that gas was entering
the dwelling from a broken gas line (id.).  The Hopkinton Fire Chief ordered the evacuation of all
emergency personnel until NSTAR could shut down the gas line (id.).  At 5:07 a.m., NSTAR
stopped the gas flow to the building, and the emergency personnel completed recovery of the
remaining victim at 6:13 a.m. (id.). 
C. Eliminating the Hazard
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4
“Service line means a distribution line that transports gas from a common source of
supply to (1) a customer meter or the connection to a customer's piping, whichever is
farther downstream, or (2) the connection to a customer's piping if there is no customer
meter.  A customer meter is the meter that measures the transfer of gas from an operator
to a consumer.”  49 C.F.R. § 192.3.
5
“Barholing” is the act of driving holes into the ground or street surface over a pipeline
followed by insertion of a probe attached to a combustible gas indicator to detect or
measure gas concentrations below the ground. 
6
“Curb valve” is a valve inserted into a service line, below grade, and is used to stem the
flow of gas to the customer.
The following chronology was taken from NSTAR’s Chronological Summary of Events
(Exh. 5).  On July 24, 2002, at 1:49 a.m., NSTAR dispatch office received a call regarding an
explosion and building collapse at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton.  At 2:12 a.m., an NSTAR service
representative and a distribution technician arrived at 65 Main Street.  Upon their arrival, the Fire
Department ordered the NSTAR personnel to shut off the service line4 to the damaged structure. 
Between 2:35 a.m. and 2:55 a.m., NSTAR shut off the gas service to 63, 66, 67, and 70 Main
Street.  NSTAR checked these buildings for evidence of gas.  No gas was detected in any of these
buildings.  Between 3:05 a.m. and 3:30 a.m., NSTAR leak surveyed the area sewer lines and
catch basins for the presence of gas.  All readings were negative.  NSTAR also barholed5 the
street, and at 3:30 a.m. determined that there was no gas underlying the street surface in the
vicinity of the distribution lines.   
Since a section of the collapsed structure overlay the service line value (“curb valve”),6
the valve was inaccessible and NSTAR was unable to immediately shut off the gas flowing into
the collapsed structure.  The NSTAR personnel summoned additional help to the scene to assist
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7
"Main means a distribution line that serves as a common source of supply for more than
one service line.”  49 C.F.R. § 192.3.
8
“Squeezing Off” is the process of collapsing the distribution main with a mechanical
device to stem the flow of gas.
with locating and closing valves on the distribution main.7  At approximately 3:20 a.m., an
NSTAR distribution crew arrived and began locating the valves on the distribution main.  The
crew also began excavating two points along the main, east and west of the service line entry to
the structure, approximately 86 feet apart.  They intended to isolate the 86-foot main segment and
the service line, squeeze off8 the plastic main, and then cut it and cap the ends.  The squeeze off
was effected at 5:07 a.m., stopping the flow of gas to the structure (Exh. 6 (photo)).
II. BACKGROUND
The incident occurred in a two and one-half story structure at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. 
This section of Main Street consists of residential and small commercial buildings, one to three
stories.  The service line entered the basement of the structure through its north wall,
approximately 4½ feet from the building’s west wall.  In response to the Department’s inquiry,
NSTAR provided a map indicating a three-inch plastic gas main, installed in 1979, underlay
Main Street (Exh. 7).  The main had 3½ feet of cover as measured by a DTE Investigator.  The
operating pressure of the main was 57 pounds per square inch gauge (“psig”) (Exh. 8).
The original service line was a one-inch steel line installed in 1947 (Exh. 9).  In 1974, a
½-inch plastic service line was installed by its insertion into the steel service line from the curb
valve to the interior of the basement (Exh. 10a).  The remaining section of the service line was a
1979 direct buried installation of a ½-inch plastic segment which replaced the original steel
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service line segment from the main to the curb valve (Exh. 10b). 
A review of the NSTAR records indicates that there is no document demonstrating
NSTAR tested for maximum operating pressure either the 1974 or the 1979 service line segments
prior to placing them into service (Exhs. 11, 12).  Forty-nine C.F.R. Part 192 sets operating limits
on pipelines placed into service after August 19, 1970, through the establishment of a maximum
allowable operating pressure (“MAOP”):
“(a)  Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no person may operate a segment
of steel or plastic pipeline at a pressure that exceeds the lowest of the following:
. . . .
(2)  The pressure obtained by dividing the pressure to which the segment was tested after
construction as follows:
  (i)  For plastic pipe in all locations, the test pressure is divided by a factor of 1.5.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.619.
NSTAR has no records demonstrating that it had established an MAOP on either of the service
line segments, as required by the General Provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part 192, Subpart L,
Operations:
“(a)  No person may operate a segment of pipeline unless it is operated in accordance
with this subpart.
(b)  Each operator shall keep records necessary to administer the procedures established
under §192.605.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.603(a)-(b).
The procedure that is set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 192.605 is:
“(b)  Maintenance and normal operations.  The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following, if applicable, to provide safety during
maintenance and operations.
. . . .
(1)  Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and Subpart M of this part.”
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9
“Meter” is a device used to measure the flow of natural gas to a customer. 
10
“Regulator” is a device used to regulate the pressure of gas to a customer. 
49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b).  Because NSTAR was unable to produce documents demonstrating
compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 192.619, which documents an operator is required to maintain
pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 192.603, the Department has reason to believe NSTAR may be in
violation of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.619 and 192.603.
III. THE INVESTIGATION
A. Description of the Scene
Upon arriving at the scene at 6:20 a.m. on July 24, 2002 (Exh. 13), two DTE Investigators
observed a two and one-half story residential structure, partially collapsed.  The north section of
the structure’s two lower levels had been completely destroyed.  The top half story of the
structure had collapsed onto the sidewalk and street (Exh. 14).  The DTE Investigators observed
windows blown out of the structures to the east and west of 65 Main Street.  The explosion had
blown debris from the first two stories of the structure at 65 Main Street onto the street (Exh.15). 
There were two excavations in the street that NSTAR had used to squeeze off the main.
The State Fire Marshal (“SFM”) investigators removed debris to gain access to the
basement (Exh. 16).  Assisted by an excavator with a demolition claw, the SFM investigators
eventually gained access to the basement where they recovered and took custody of natural gas
appliances, meters,9 regulator,10 and interior piping (id.).  Once the evidence and debris had been
removed from the structure and basement, the foundation was filled in with gravel.
B. Pressure Testing of the Main and Service Line
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11 This 39-inch segment is listed by Massachusetts Materials Research, Inc. as Items 17 and
18 in MMR Table I.
To determine any failure point in the distribution system, NSTAR prepared to isolate and
pressure test the distribution system in proximity to 65 Main Street.  The Department  witnesses
these tests in a post-incident environment.  On July 24, 2002, at approximately 6:47 p.m. (Exh.
5), the SFM allowed NSTAR to excavate the service line to 65 Main Street.  NSTAR also
enlarged the two excavations at the main where the squeeze-off devices had been installed.  This
allowed NSTAR to cut out two sections of the main inside the squeeze-off points and install end
caps on the termini of the 86-foot main segment.  NSTAR also cut out a 39-inch section of the
service line11 where it entered the basement, turning over this evidence to the SFM (Exh. 17). 
NSTAR then capped off the end of the service line outside the foundation.  The upstream end of
the service line was still attached to the 86-foot section of the isolated main segment.  
Between 7:30 p.m. and 9:50 p.m., NSTAR prepared to pressure test the isolated segment
of the distribution system (Exh. 5).  This included the 86 feet of three-inch plastic main, the
service line to 65 Main Street, and the service line to 66 Main Street, where an air compressor
was tied into the service riser to infuse air into the isolated piping segment (id.).  After the DTE
Investigators reviewed the pressure test configuration, the DTE Investigators observed while
NSTAR pressurized the disconnected line segment to 58 psig (Exhs. 18; 19).  The DTE
Investigators witnessed that the line pressure held stable from 10:15 p.m. to 11:20 p.m. (Exh. 5). 
Therefore, the pressure test eliminated the 86-foot main segment and the two service line
segments as possible sources of gas leakage.  The jurisdictional piping inside the structure was
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12 The Department has jurisdiction over operator-owned piping.  The customer-owned
recovered materials are not jurisdictional to the Department and were not tested as part of
this investigation.
13 Table I, below, summarizes the NSTAR work orders (Exh. 20).
14 In general, red-tagging means that the operator shall shut off service to a customer or
close off a valve to an appliance until an unsafe condition is corrected.
15
“Each meter for measuring gas … shall, not later than seven years from the date of
installation or replacement, be removed by the company … and replaced by it with such a
meter which has been newly tested, sealed and stamped in accordance with law.”  G.L. c.
164, § 115A.
16 The Careys’ apartment was served by two meters.
not tested at this time nor was the non-jurisdictional piping downstream of the meter.12  The DTE
Investigators then directed their attention to the piping inside the foundation of 65 Main Street.
C. Service Calls to 65 Main Street
The Department reviewed documentation regarding NSTAR service visits to 65 Main
Street, from June 1, 2001 to June 5, 2002, and identified the following13:   
1. On June 1, 2001, there was a faint gas odor at the dryer in the Carey apartment
(Exh. 20a).  NSTAR repaired a leak in the flex hose on the dryer.  In addition, the
work order indicates that the service person red-tagged14 the appliance due to an
illegal dryer vent (Exh. 20b).  
2. On February 22, 2002, NSTAR visited 65 Main Street for a seven-year meter
replacement15 for apartment 3, the DeFreitas’ apartment (Exh. 20c).  
3. On March 6, 2002, NSTAR performed a seven-year meter replacement for one of
the Carey meters16 (Exh. 20d).  A short time later that day, the Careys reported a
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gas odor in the front of the house (Exh. 20e).  No leak was found inside or outside
the dwelling (Exh 20f).  
4. On March 12, 2002, NSTAR performed a seven-year meter replacement for the
Webster apartment (Exh 20g).  
5. On May 23, 2002, NSTAR visited 65 Main Street once, completing seven-year
meter replacements for Maijs (Exh. 20h) and the Careys (Exh. 20i). 
 6. On May 24, 2002, NSTAR returned to 65 Main Street to turn on the Maijs’ gas
and relight the Careys’ appliances (Exhs. 20j; 20k).  
7. On June 4, 2002, NSTAR visited 65 Main Street to shut off one of the Carey
meters for non-payment (Exh. 20m). 
8.  NSTAR returned on June 5, 2002, to turn on the previously shut off Carey meter
(Exh. 20n).  NSTAR returned later that day to relight the Carey water heater (Exh.
20o).
In 2002, between February 22 and June 5, NSTAR entered 65 Main Street a total of nine
times.  The purpose of one of those visits was to investigate a reported gas odor which resulted in
a negative gas finding.  The remaining visits were statutorily required meter changes, and
relights, one meter shut-off, and one meter turn-on.   NSTAR personnel reported no leakage or
odor in their comments while performing the work.
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Table I
Visit
Number
Date Time Work Order Description of visit
1 06/01/2001 9:20pm-9:35pm 0102-72545 Repair leak on flex connector at
dryer.
2 02/22/2002 2:10pm-2:40pm 0202-96521 7 year meter change out and relit
appliances.
3 03/06/2002 2:45pm-3:15pm 0203-55159 7 year meter change out.
4 03/06/2002 4:30pm-5:00pm 0203-55717 Investigate odor complaint, no leak
found. 
5 03/12/2002 12:40pm-1:10pm 0203-82806 7 year meter change out.
6 05/23/2002 11:20am-11:45am 0207-53676 7 year meter change out.
05/23/2002 11:45am-12:15pm 0207-53683 7 year meter change out.
7 05/24/2002 12:45pm-1:00pm 0207-58312 Relit appliances after meter change
out.
05/24/2002 1:00pm-1:15pm 0207-59243 Relit appliances after meter change
out. 
8 06/04/2002 7:50am-8:00am 0208-44930 Shut off meter for nonpayment.
9 06/05/2002 3:35pm-4:05pm 0208-44930 Turn on meter after shut off for
nonpayment.
10 06/05/2002 8:00pm-8:25pm 0208-54895 Relit water heater after shut off for
nonpayment. 
D. Leakage Surveys
NSTAR performed a winter leakage survey in January 2002.  This survey is in 
accordance with its Operating and Maintenance Plan (“O&M Plan”).  The following is to be used
as a guide for conducting additional leak surveys as frequently as experience and technology
indicate necessary:  “(1) Surveys during winter months when frost heave could result in leakage.” 
O&M Plan OM-60g.  A review of the leakage surveys of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton, revealed
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17 Leakage surveys are conducted using vehicle-mounted gas detectors to locate leaks
underlying the street (mobile survey) or with hand-held units to survey the service lines
running from the street to the meter (walking survey).
there were no leaks observed in the walking or mobile surveys17 conducted in January 2002.  On
January 10, 2002, the NSTAR leakage surveyor detected a non-hazardous leak on the service line
to 74 Main Street, Hopkinton (Exh. 21).  This was the only leak detected on the service lines
located between 2 and 106 Main Street (id.).  On July 2, 2002, NSTAR conducted a mobile
survey of the distribution system underlying the roadway of Main Street, finding no leaks (Exh.
22).  NSTAR also performed a business district leakage survey on July 15, 2002.  On this date,
NSTAR recorded that it leak surveyed sections of Main Street, and it leak surveyed meters in
commercial buildings and buildings of assembly (Exh. 23).  This record makes no reference to
entry into any residence or building in which resided a gas meter (id.).
Forty-nine C.F.R. Part 192 requires that operators leak survey the distribution system
periodically.  The regulation defines intervals of frequency for leakage survey as stated below:
“(a)  Each operator of a distribution system shall conduct periodic leakage surveys in
accordance with this section.
(b)  The type and scope of the leakage control program must be determined by the nature
of the operations and the local conditions, but it must meet the following minimum
requirements:
(1)  A leakage survey with leak detector equipment must be conducted in business
districts, including tests of the atmosphere in gas, electric, telephone, sewer, and water
system manholes, at cracks in pavement and sidewalks, and at other locations providing
an opportunity for finding gas leaks, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year.”
49 C.F.R.§ 192.723(a) and (b)(1) (emphasis added).  NSTAR’s O&M Plan defines the following
terms with respect to leakage survey. 
“a. Building:  Any structure which is normally or occasionally entered by humans for
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18 An odorometer is an instrument which mixes gas and air to measurable concentrations. 
The tester increases the gas-air ratio to a point where he smells a change in the odor of the
mixture (threshold reading) and increases the gas-air ratio until he smells a gas odor in the
(continued...)
business, residential or other purposes, and in which gas could accumulate.
. . . .
c. Business District:  Areas with wall-to-wall paving and/or where the principal
commercial activity of the city or town takes place.
. . . .
1. Leak Survey:  A search for possible gas leakage in any area where gas facilities
exist, or where a gas leak is reported or suspected.”
O&M Plan OM-60, at 1-2 (emphasis added).  NSTAR conducted its leakage survey of the
Hopkinton business district through its mobile survey on July 2, 2002, and its walking survey on
July 15, 2002.  There is no reference to any leakage survey performed on the interior service line
piping of 65 Main Street during the July 15 walking survey.    
In its O&M Plan, NSTAR requires leakage surveys to be performed where gas facilities
exist.  This encompasses any building housing NSTAR facilities, including residential structures,
as stated by NSTAR, above.  This provision of the O&M Plan is consistent with the applicable
federal regulations.  See 49 C.F.R. § 192.723(a) and (b)(1).  Because NSTAR did not perform a
leakage survey on the interior service line piping of 65 Main Street during its July 15 walking
survey, the Department has reason to believe NSTAR may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. §
192.723(a) and (b)(1).
E. Odorant Levels
As part of any incident investigation, the Department requires an operator to verify that
the odorant level of the gas meets the regulatory requirements.  On the day of the incident,
NSTAR took odorometer18 readings to determine the intensity of the odorant in the natural gas
Incident Report
65 Main Street, Hopkinton (July 24, 2002)
Page 15
18 (...continued)
flowing through Main Street.  The Hopkinton Police Station and the Hopkinton Fire Station were
chosen as representative sample points to conduct the tests because of their close proximity to 65
Main Street.  Two NSTAR representatives performed the tests.  At the Police Station, the
readings at which the individuals detected a distinct gas odor were 0.05% and 0.10% gas in air
(Exh. 24a).  At the Fire Station, the readings by the same two individuals were 0.04% and 0.10%
gas in air (id.).  State regulation states, in relevant part:
“A combustion gas in a distribution line shall have a distinctive odor of sufficient
intensity so that a concentration of 0.15% gas in the air is readily perceptible to
the normal or average olfactory senses of a person coming from fresh
uncontaminated air into a closed room containing one part of the gas in 666 parts
of air.”
220 C.M.R. § 101.06(20)(a).  Both NSTAR test personnel detected gas at much lower
concentrations than the 0.15% gas-air mixture required in the above regulation.  Given the
detectability of gas at the lower gas-air concentrations, the odorant levels met the regulatory
requirement.
In a review of the 2002 weekly odorant levels throughout the area surrounding
Hopkinton, the record indicates that NSTAR met the regulatory requirements (Exh. 24b).  Thus,
gas odorant levels do not appear to have contributed to the incident.
F. Recovered Material
In the aftermath of the incident, the DTE Investigators worked with the SFM investigators
to recover material in an effort to determine the cause and origin of this incident.  The recovered
material is divided into two categories.  The first category is customer-owned equipment, such as
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19 Ms. Janet Webster stated to a DTE Investigator that when she investigated the loud sound
from the basement prior to leaving the house on the morning of July 24, 2002, she noticed
the basement door, located on a side porch, was open (Exh. 2a).  She was certain that she
had locked it prior to retiring (id.).
appliances in the apartments, water heaters in the basement, and any piping emanating from the
meters or piping feeding appliances.  The second category is operator-owned piping, including
the service line entry through the building wall, the regulator and associated vent line, the meters,
and any piping or fittings connecting such.  The separation point between the two categories is
the outlet of each gas meter.  Any equipment downstream, i.e., on the customer side of the meter,
is external to the operator’s distribution system and not jurisdictional to the Department pursuant
to federal pipeline safety regulations.  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.1(a) and 192.3.
Since the SFM could not rule out criminal activity as a cause of the incident,19 that office
took custody of all material recovered from the site to continue its criminal investigation.  On
November 15, 2002, the SFM shared physical custody of the operator-owned material with the
Department, so that the Department could proceed with the metallurgical examination of the
evidence.  In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 192.617, NSTAR selected Massachusetts Materials
Research, Inc. (“MMR”) of West Boylston, Massachusetts to conduct the testing of the
Department jurisdictional piping and appurtenances (“recovered material”).
G. Meter Readings and Gas Usage
The Department reviewed the post-incident meter readings and the meter reading records
of the five meters at 65 Main Street.  This analysis was performed to determine if any meter
displayed excessive gas flow which could indicate a leak downstream of the gas meter.  The
Department Investigators compared the records for March through July of 2002 with the records
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for the same time period in 2001 for all of the meters at 65 Main Street. (See Table II, below).  
The meter readings do not indicate anomalies that would indicate a massive volume of gas
passing through a meter into a “failed” segment of house piping indicative of a gas leak prior to
the incident. 
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TABLE II
USAGE MARCH-JULY, 2002
CUSTOMER MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY
Webster 7 ccf,
31 days, (A)
6 ccf,
30 days, (A)
5 ccf,
29 days, (A)
4 ccf,
32 days, (A)
2 ccf,
16 days, (L)
Maijs 21 ccf,
31 days, (A)
12 ccf,
30 days, (A)
6 ccf,
30 days, (E)
8 ccf,
62 days, (E)
1 ccf,
15 days, (L)
Carey
(Heating)
347 ccf,
61 days, (A)
83 ccf,
30 days, (A)
52 ccf,
21 days, (F)
36 ccf,
33 days, (A)
13 ccf,
16 days, (L)
Carey 3 ccf,
31 days, (A)
2 ccf,
30 days, (A)
0 ccf,
29 days, (A)
5 ccf,
62 days, (E)
0 ccf,
9 days, (L)
DeFreitas 21 ccf,
31 days, (A)
21 ccf,
30 days, (A)
19 ccf,
29 days, (A)
22 ccf,
32 days, (A)
7 ccf,
16 days, (L)
USAGE MARCH-JULY, 2001
CUSTOMER MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY
Webster 6 ccf,
28 days, (A)
7 ccf,
31 days, (A)
8 ccf,
29 days, (A)
5 ccf,
32 days, (A)
5 ccf,
29 days, (A)
Maijs 22 ccf,
28 days, (A)
4 ccf,
31 days, (A)
4 ccf,
29 days, (A)
3 ccf,
32 days, (A)
4 ccf,
29 days, (A)
Carey
 (Heating)
136 ccf,
28 days, (A)
75 ccf,
31 days, (A)
62 ccf,
29 days, (A)
33 ccf,
32 days, (A)
31ccf,
29 days, (A)
Carey 2 ccf,
28 days, (A)
3 ccf,
31 days, (A)
0 ccf,
32 days, (E)
0 ccf,
30 days, (E)
3 ccf,
29 days, (E)
DeFreitas 25 ccf,
28 days, (A)
27 ccf,
31 days, (A)
16 ccf,
29 days, (A)
9 ccf,
32 days, (A)
8 ccf,
29 days, (A)
NOTES:
1. ccf: hundred cubic feet of gas
2. (A): Actual Meter Reading from a remote read meter
3. (E): Estimated gas usage 
4. (F): Final, shut off or read/out
5. (L): Based on the meter reading on 7/24/02
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20 In an annual letter to all operators, the Director of the Pipeline Engineering and Safety
Division requests that operators inform the Department of any incident promptly, but no
more than two hours after discovery of an incident. 
H. Distribution Line Valves
Two NSTAR personnel arrived at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton at 2:12 a.m. on July 24,
2002, 22 minutes after the NSTAR Dispatcher received notice of the incident (Exh. 5).  At 3:10
a.m., the two NSTAR personnel were trying to locate the curb valve to shut off the gas flowing
into the wreckage of the house, where it was known that one deceased victim still lay (Exh. 25). 
The curb valve lay under the house wreckage, and NSTAR could not gain access to it to shut off
the flow of gas to the house (id.).  At 3:30 a.m., a distribution crew arrived at the scene and began
to excavate with the intent to squeeze off the main and to locate the distribution valves needed to
shut down gas flow to the system near the collapsed house (id.).  At 4:03 a.m., the NSTAR
Distribution Manager arrived at the site with the maps indicating the locations of the valves
needed to isolate the system (Exh. 5).  At 4:09, an NSTAR supervisor was informed of the valve
locations and prepared to shut down the valves on the main to isolate the system (id.).  At 4:28
a.m., the Distribution Manager notified the Department of the incident (id.).20
At 4:34 a.m., an NSTAR supervisor reported that he was unable to shut off one of the
essential distribution line valves necessary to isolate the area (Exh. 25).  This specific valve was
located at the intersection of Hayden Rowe Street and Main Street (id.).  The valve box was not
centered over the valve, denying access to NSTAR (id.).  NSTAR’s map indicates that at least six
distribution valves would have to be closed to isolate 65 Main Street (Exh. 26).  Going from west
to east along Main Street, the valves are identified and numbered as follows:
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"High pressure distribution system means a distribution system in which the gas pressure
in the main is higher than the pressure provided to the customer.”  49 C.F.R. § 192.3.
Valve # Location
083 Main Street just west of the Mt. Auburn Street intersection.
020 Grove Street on the northern intersection of Main Street.
052 Grove Street on the southern intersection of Main Street.
146 Walcott Street on the northern intersection of Main Street.
024 Church Street on the southern intersection with Main Street.
079 Main Street just east of Church Street; or
080 Main Street just west of Hayden Rowe Street.
For complete isolation, access to the first five valves and at least one of the last two valves was
necessary (id.).  
Forty-nine C.F.R. Part 192 requires that operators install valves on high pressure
distribution systems to enable the operator to shut down the system in an emergency.    
“Each high-pressure distribution system21 must have valves spaced so as to reduce the
time to shut down a section of main in an emergency.  The valve spacing is determined by
the operating pressure, the size of the mains, and the local physical conditions.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.181(a).  A review of the distribution map indicates NSTAR has valves
strategically located to enable isolation of any section of Main Street.     
The design and installation regulation contained in 49 C.F.R. Part 192 also requires that a
valve on a main be in a readily accessible location and the operating mechanism be accessible.
“(c) Each valve on a main installed for operating or emergency purposes must comply
with the following:
(1)  The valve must be placed in a readily accessible location so as to facilitate its
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22 The following state statute became effective April 1, 2003:  “[w]henever the
commonwealth or a city or town undertakes the repair of streets, roads or sidewalks the
appropriate gas company shall provide for the maintenance and improvements of its gate
boxes located in the streets, roads or sidewalks to be repaired, so that the gate boxes are
more easily and immediately accessible.”  G.L. c. 164, § 116B.  Because the incident
predates the effective date of this statute, there is no violation.
operation in an emergency.
(2)  The operating stem or mechanism must be readily accessible.”       
49 C.F.R. § 192.181(c)(1)-(2).
Conversely, there is no requirement in 49 C.F.R. § 192.605 for an operator to have a
maintenance program to preserve the accessibility of all distribution line valves.  This is
underscored in a September 12, 2003 Opinion Letter, issued by the U.S. DOT Office of Pipeline
Safety (Exh. 27).
“Section § 192.181(c)(1) is in Subpart D, Design of Pipeline Components.  It addresses
minimum requirements for the design and installation of pipeline components.  It does
not require an operator to maintain all valves in accordance with § 192.747.”
Although one of NSTAR’s valves was not accessible, there is no violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 192
because it does not require an operator to maintain the accessibility of distribution valves.22
IV. METALLURGICAL TESTING
A. General
On December 4, 2002, after NSTAR publicly noticed the prospective metallurgical
testing, the Department and MMR held a procedural conference to announce the protocol for the
testing of the recovered material subject to Department jurisdiction (Exh. 28).  Because the
customer-owned material is not jurisdictional to the Department, it was not included in the
protocol (Exh. 29).  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.1(a) and 192.3.  The customer-owned material
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23 A revised Protocol was prepared on December 31, 2002 in response to the comments
submitted by interested persons.  An interested person did contract with MMR for the
performance of a supplemental pull test of an exemplar fitting.  MMR Report at 17.
24 Copies of this report are available from MMR.
25 MMR Report at 11.
26 MMR Report at 13.
recovered from the site remains in the sole custody of the SFM.  The Department allowed all
interested persons the opportunity to comment on the testing protocol, suggest alternative testing,
or suggest additional testing23 (at the requestor’s expense) as well as observe the testing (Exh.
30).  The metallurgical testing began on January 6, 2003.  MMR submitted a report on August 8,
2003 (“MMR Report”).24
B. Non-Destructive Testing
MMR examined all piping and appurtenances recovered from the basement from the
point of entry to the outlet of the meters.  These items are listed in the December 4, 2002 MMR
letter to the “Department” as items 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 (Exh. 29).  All the
recovered material was examined visually, measured, photographed, leak tested, and analyzed for
fractures. 
Radiographic analysis of all metallic recovered material showed that none of the threaded
fittings contained anomalies and were not the cause of the incident.25  Leak testing under Protocol
item 3 showed insignificant leaks in the system that were located in regions which would have
been susceptible to damage in the incident.26  Pressure/flow testing conducted on the service
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27 MMR Report at 13.
28 MMR Report at 40.
29 MMR Report at 41.
30 MMR Report at 42.
31 MMR Report at 43.
32 MMR Report at 44.
regulator confirmed that there was no malfunction in its operating mode.27
MMR conducted fracture analysis by microscopic examination of all metallic gas-
carrying recovered materials.  MMR determined that five fractures should be reviewed more
closely with a scanning electron microscope to determine the cause of separation.  Upon such
review, MMR concluded the following:
MMR #6 Fracture Surface - “This type of fracture feature is consistent with damage
incurred during the incident under the single application of a force that exceeded the
capability of the material. No features were observed that would indicate material
defects.”28
MMR #9 Fracture Surface - “This piece possesses fracture features consistent with being
caused by the incident. No features were observed that would indicate material defects.”29
MMR #10 (Male Thread End) - “This type of fracture is consistent with being caused by
the incident. No features were observed that would indicate material defects.”30 
MMR #11 (Meter #4231 outlet) - “The fracture features seen on this specimen are
consistent with being caused by the event. No features were observed that would indicate
material defects.”31
MMR #11 (Regulator relief pipe) - “[T]his fracture is consistent with having been  caused
by the incident. No features were observed that would indicate material defects.”32
In summary, the MMR non-destructive testing concluded that the fractures were not the cause of
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33 MMR Report at 50.
34 A transition fitting is a fitting which joins a plastic pipe to a steel pipe.  In the MMR
Report, it is sometimes referred to as a basement adaptor.
35 The service regulator outlet is the dividing line between the high and low pressure
segments of the service line.  Any point on the service line before or upstream of the
regulator outlet is on the high pressure segment of the service line.
36 MMR Report at 1-2.
the incident.33 
C. Transition Fitting
The MMR fracture analysis of recovered material indicates that the fractures occurred
during the collapse of the building.  A transition fitting34 was located on the high pressure section
of the service line.35  The transition fitting was located just inside the basement wall prior to the
explosion.  It was found in two sections by SFM and DTE Investigators and documented by
MMR as #18 (upstream segment) and #11 (downstream segment).36  The fractured transition
fitting is an adaptor (sometimes called a “basement adaptor”) for PE tubing of ¾-inch FPT x 1-
inch MPT x ½-inch CTS, manufactured by Inner-Tite Corporation (Exhs. 31; 32).  
Although the noise heard by witnesses in the moments prior to the incident was not
determined to have originated from a failure in the high pressure segment of the service line, the
noise, accompanied by the odor of gas, warranted investigation of the only fractured high
pressure service line segment. Because the witnesses who had been awake in the early morning
of July 24, 2002 described a loud noise, accompanied by the odor of gas, prior to the explosion,
MMR focused on the transition fitting.  During the visual inspection, MMR noted that the: 
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37 In this configuration, the plastic service line had been inserted into the original steel
service line.  The original steel service line was threaded into the upstream female
transition fitting segment.  The plastic pipe, housed inside the steel service line passed
through the innards of the upstream and downstream segments of the transition fitting,
held into place by a ferrule, a steel washer and a rubber gasket and compression. 
38 MMR Report at 11.
39 Friable means “readily crumbled; brittle.”  American Heritage College Dictionary.
40 MMR Report at 10.
41 MMR Report at 11.
42 MMR Report at 23, 25.
“Photographs of the foundation sleeve [also called a service sleeve]37 show a heavily
corroded pipe with a portion of its wall missing at the six o’clock position (as installed in-
service).  Water seeping into the basement along this foundation sleeve and collecting to
drip from the bottom (or 6 o’clock position) would produce this missing type of wall
pattern through corrosion and gradual material wastage over time.  This is also consistent
with the corroded appearance of both transition fitting pieces and the “T” assembly to
which they were in contact during service.  Incoming water would have a much more
difficult time running upwards onto a vertical basement riser pipe; however, and the
piping and meters on the rest of MMR # 11 show markedly less corrosion than the
transition fitting and other items near the gas inlet that were oriented in a horizontal way
during service.”38
The transition fitting displayed heavy corrosion around its outer surface.  MMR describes this as
“a friable39 layer of corrosion.”40  One of the water heaters in the basement displayed heavy
corrosion around its base.  The fieldstone foundation and dirt floor basement of the structure
contained a sump pump.  These conditions led MMR to state in its report “that the basement was
a humid, and at times wet, environment.”41  MMR states that the corrosion may have been the
result of aggressive chlorine attack since the orientation and amounts of chlorine were consistent
with soil runoff as opposed to human handling and water residue from the fire fighting effort.42 
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43 MMR Report at 29.
44 MMR Report at 51.
45 MMR Report at 51.
The transition fitting was found in two sections in the incident site debris, one of which
was a part of MMR #11, and the other part of MMR #18.  MMR conducted leak testing of the
transition fitting in two stages.  The downstream segment, MMR #11, was adapted for pressure
testing at 57 psig.  The test indicated only minuscule leakage on the valve attached to the
transition fitting, but not on the transition fitting segment itself.  MMR next inserted item #18
into item #11 as described in the MMR Report.43  The threaded mechanical attachment between
the upstream and downstream sections had degraded to a point where the two pieces were not
fastened.  MMR attempted to determine if the operating pressure would cause separation of the
joined transition fitting parts.  The pressure test revealed that the line pressure would not force
the two segments of the transition fitting apart.44  In conclusion, MMR states that the transition
fitting came apart as the result of either the explosion/and or collapse of the house, or the
application of an unknown external force or forces (not necessarily directly applied to the
jurisdictional piping) prior to the event.45
V. CORROSION REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
A. Introduction
The MMR Report attributes the corroded state of the transition fitting to water contact. 
Although MMR did not determine that the failure of the transition fitting occurred prior to the
explosion, DTE has reason to believe its corroded state presented a situation that should have
Incident Report
65 Main Street, Hopkinton (July 24, 2002)
Page 27
been addressed by NSTAR.  As evidenced from the photos (Exhs. 31; 32), the visual appearance
of the transition fitting warranted examination by NSTAR with appropriate remedial action, if
required. 
B. Initial Evaluation
Forty-nine C.F.R. Part 192 requires each operator of a natural gas distribution system to
make an initial evaluation of any operator-owned piping exposed to the atmosphere for
environments conducive to atmospheric corrosion.  Specifically, it states:
“Pipelines installed after July 31, 1971.  Each aboveground pipeline or portion of a
pipeline installed after July 31, 1971 that is exposed to the atmosphere must be cleaned
and either coated or jacketed with a material suitable for the prevention of atmospheric
corrosion.  An operator need not comply with this paragraph, if the operator can
demonstrate by test, investigation, or experience in the area of application, that a
corrosive atmosphere does not exist.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.479(a).  NSTAR has no record of having made an initial evaluation in 1974
when it installed the transition fitting in the basement of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton.  However,
the federal code does not mandate retention of such a record for greater than five years.  See
49 C.F.R. § 192.491(c).  Therefore, the lack of a record of any initial evaluation does not
constitute a violation.
C. Reevaluation and Remedial Action
Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 192, operators must monitor pipelines for the presence of
atmospheric corrosion and take appropriate action when necessary.  Forty-nine C.F.R. § 192.481
states:
“After meeting the requirements of § 192.479 (a) and (b), each operator shall, at intervals
not exceeding 3 years for onshore pipelines … reevaluate each pipeline that is exposed to
the atmosphere and take remedial action whenever necessary to maintain protection
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against atmospheric corrosion.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.481.
NSTAR has produced no record demonstrating that had met the reevaluation 
requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 192.481 with reference to the jurisdictional metal piping in the
basement of the structure.  Although MMR did not specifically identify the corrosion of the
transition fitting as atmospheric corrosion, NSTAR’s maintenance records for the interior piping
at 65 Main Street omit any reference to compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 192.481.  In response to a
Division request (Exh.11) for the corrosion records of 65 Main Street, NSTAR responded that it
was not required to retain corrosion records because the steel main and service had been renewed
with plastic (Exh.12).  NSTAR is correct in its interpretation of the regulation in that replacement
of all underground piping for 65 Main Street with plastic relieved NSTAR of the burden of
corrosion monitoring and protection.  NSTAR is incorrect in its interpretation of the regulation
with respect to the portion of the service line located inside the basement of 65 Main Street,
which was steel pipe exposed to the atmosphere.  NSTAR’s response also implies that it was not
required to monitor the remaining steel section of the service line.  NSTAR produced no record
that it had performed any monitoring of the interior metal piping exposed to the atmosphere
within the three-year interval specified in the regulation. 
The federal regulations further require that certain corrosion control records be
maintained.  49 C.F.R. § 192.491.  The reevaluation required by 49 C.F.R. § 192.481 must be
maintained as described below:
“Each operator shall maintain a record of each test, survey, or inspection required by this
subpart in sufficient detail to demonstrate the adequacy of corrosion control measures or
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46 Forty-nine C.F.R. § 192.465 refers to monitoring of external corrosion controls of
underground piping.
47 Forty-nine C.F.R. § 192.475 refers to internal corrosion.
that a corrosive condition does not exist.  These records must be retained for at least 5
years, except that records related to §§ 192.465 (a) and (e)46 and 192.475(b)47 must be
retained for as long as the pipeline remains in service.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.491(c).  NSTAR produced no documentation to demonstrate that it had
reevaluated the metal segment of the service line inside 65 Main Street, Hopkinton within the last
five years.  Even if NSTAR had performed the reevaluation, the corroded metal pipe segment
reveals that no remedial action had been taken to maintain protection as required by 49 C.F.R. §
192.481.  Because of the presence of visible friable corrosion, some type of remedial action as
provided by 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.479(a) and 192.481 was required. Therefore, the Department has
reason to believe NSTAR may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.481 and 192.491.
D. O&M Plan
 Forty-nine C.F.R. Part 192 also requires operators of gas distribution systems to follow a
manual of written procedures in operations, maintenance and emergency response.   
“(a)  General.   Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of
written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and for
emergency response.”
. . . . 
“(b)  Maintenance and normal operations.  The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following, if applicable, to provide safety during
maintenance and operations.
(1)  Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart M of this part.
(2)  Controlling corrosion in accordance with the operations and maintenance
requirements of subpart I of this part.”
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49 C.F.R. § 192.605 (b)(1) and (2).
Corrosion control is a function specified in 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(2).  The NSTAR O&M Plan
is the written manual of procedures that NSTAR employs in meeting the requirements of 49
C.F.R. § 192.605(a).  In its O&M Plan, NSTAR states the following with reference to
atmospheric corrosion:
“4. Remedial Measures for Corroded Pipe
General
Pipelines installed after July 31, 1971, that are or have any ponion [sic] exposed to the
atmosphere will be cleaned and either coated or jacketed with a material suitable for the
prevention of atmospheric corrosion. Although operator need not comply with this
requirement if he can demonstrate by test, investigation or experience in the area of
application, that a corrosive atmosphere does not exist, it is suggested that coating be
undertaken.
For pipelines installed after August 1, 1971, that are or have any portion exposed to the
atmosphere, the operator must determine the areas of atmospheric corrosion on the
pipeline. If atmospheric corrosion is found, apply remedial measure. These areas of
atmospheric corrosion on the pipeline must be cleaned to bright metal, and coated or
jacketed with a material suitable for the prevention of atmospheric corrosion.
Monitoring
After meeting the requirements of(kn~r~1 [sic] above, the operator shall, at intervals not
exceeding three (3) years for onshore pipelines, reevaluate each pipeline that is exposed
to the atmosphere and take remedial action whenever necessary to maintain protection
against atmospheric corrosion.”
O&M Plan OM-66.  
As stated above, 49 C.F.R. § 192.491(c) specifies that the record retention period for the
General and Monitoring requirements, as stated in the NSTAR O&M Plan, is five years.  Within
that five-year period set forth in 49 C.F.R. 192.491(c), there should have been at least one record
in which NSTAR monitored the condition of the interior service line piping located in the
basement of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton.  There is no record of any such inspection, nor has
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NSTAR stated that it had met the requirement (Exh.12).  Therefore, the Department has reason to
believe NSTAR may not be in compliance with its O&M Plan which may be a violation of 49
C.F.R. § 192.605(a).  
VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Findings
1. Historical
a.  On June 30, 1947, a one-inch bare steel service line was installed to 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton.
b.  On October 8, 1974, a ½-inch plastic service line was inserted into the one-inch steel
service line from the curb valve into the basement of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. 
c.  On October 8, 1974, an Inner-Tite transition fitting (basement adaptor) was installed in
the basement of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton.
d.  In October of 1979, a three-inch plastic main was installed in front of 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton.
e.  On October 25, 1979, a ½-inch plastic service line was installed connecting the three-
inch plastic main to the curb valve on the service line to 65 Main Street, Hopkinton.
f.  There are no records to demonstrate that NSTAR tested the sections of service line
installed on October 8, 1974 and on October 25, 1979 to establish an MAOP.
g.  NSTAR’s business district leakage survey did not include entry into 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton on July 15, 2002.
h.  Between January 2002 and July 2002, NSTAR entered 65 Main Street, Hopkinton
nine times.
i.  The odorant levels within the Main Street, Hopkinton distribution piping met the state
and federal detection levels in the months prior to and including July 24, 2002.
2. The Incident
a.  In the early morning of July 24, 2002, several residents of 65 Main Street heard a loud,
unidentifiable noise.
b.  In the early morning of July 24, 2002, several residents of 65 Main Street detected the
odor of natural gas.
c.  At approximately 1:41 a.m. on July 24, 2002, approximately ten minutes after the loud
noises woke some residents, the structure at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton, exploded.
d.  Most of the residents  escaped from the remains of the demolished structure with the
exception of the two Carey children.
e.  Shortly after their arrival, rescue personnel were able to retrieve one seriously injured
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victim from the debris and determine that the remaining victim was deceased.
f.  NSTAR arrived at the site of the explosion at 2:12 a.m., July 24, 2002.
g. The service line curb valve could not be closed because the debris of the house lay over
it.
h.  NSTAR shut off the service lines to the neighboring houses by 2:55 a.m.
i.  None of the neighboring houses measured positive for the presence of gas.
j.  By 3:30 a.m., NSTAR had completed its gas surveys in the drainage and sewer lines
and the ground beneath the street for gas with no positive readings.
k.  NSTAR could not shut off the flow of gas to the incident site because at least one
valve was inaccessible.
l.  NSTAR notified the Department of the incident at 4:28 a.m.
m. NSTAR squeezed off the flow of gas to the demolished structure at 5:07 a.m.
n.  The incident resulted in two fatalities.
3. Post-Incident
a.  Emergency personnel recovered the last deceased victim at 6:13 a.m.
b.  The distribution system, external to the foundation of 65 Main Street, sustained line
pressure of 58 psig for 65 minutes, ruling out any distribution line leakage in proximity to
the structure. 
c.  The SFM took custody of all recovered appliances, piping, and appurtenances.
d.  NSTAR selected MMR as the laboratory to perform the testing to meet the
requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 192.617.
e.  As part of the Department investigation, MMR restricted its testing to those segments
of recovered materials that were owned and operated by NSTAR and jurisdictional to the
Department.
f.  MMR observed no material defects in the fractured segments of recovered material 
and concluded through its non-destructive testing that some fractures in the recovered
material had occurred as a result of the event.  
g.  MMR found only one failure on the service line on the high pressure side of the
service regulator.
h.  MMR found the transition fitting to be heavily corroded on its outer surface.
i.  MMR concluded that the transition fitting would not have failed under line pressure
without the application of external forces.     
j.  MMR concluded that the transition fitting came apart as the result of either the
explosion/and or collapse of the house, or the application of an unknown external force or
forces (not necessarily directly applied to the jurisdictional piping) prior to the event.
l.  NSTAR had no records to demonstrate that it had monitored the interior piping of 65
Main Street, Hopkinton for atmospheric corrosion within the last five years.
B. Conclusions
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1.  NSTAR has no records to demonstrate that the service line segments, installed in 1974
and 1979, were tested to establish an MAOP.  NSTAR should have tested each service line
segment to 1.5 times the MAOP.  Therefore, the Department has reason to believe that NSTAR
may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 192:
“(a)  Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no person may operate a segment
of steel or plastic pipeline at a pressure that exceeds the lowest of the following:
. . . .
(2)  The pressure obtained by dividing the pressure to which the segment was tested after
construction as follows:
(I)  For plastic pipe in all locations, the test pressure is divided by a factor of 1.5.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.619(a)(2)(i).
2.  In failing to meet the requirements of Subpart L, the Department has reason to believe
that NSTAR may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 109.603(a), which states:  “(a)  No person may
operate a segment of pipeline unless it is operated in accordance with this subpart.”  49 C.F.R. §
192.603(a). 
3.  NSTAR did not monitor the steel service line in the basement of 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton for atmospheric corrosion in the five-year period prior to July 24, 2002.  Therefore,
the Department has reason to believe NSTAR may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 192:
“After meeting the requirements of § 192.479 (a) and (b), each operator shall, at intervals
not exceeding 3 years for onshore pipelines … reevaluate each pipeline that is exposed to
the atmosphere and take remedial action whenever necessary to maintain protection
against atmospheric corrosion.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.481.
4.  NSTAR failed to perform leakage surveys of its service lines located inside 65 Main
Street, Hopkinton, as required by 49 C.F.R. Part 192:
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“(a)  Each operator of a distribution system shall conduct periodic leakage surveys in
accordance with this section.
(b)  The type and scope of the leakage control program must be determined by the nature
of the operations and the local conditions, but it must meet the following minimum
requirements:
(1)  A leakage survey with leak detector equipment must be conducted in business
districts, including tests of the atmosphere in gas, electric, telephone, sewer, and water
system manholes, at cracks in pavement and sidewalks, and at other locations providing
an opportunity for finding gas leaks, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.723.  Therefore, the Department has reason to believe NSTAR may be in
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.723.
5. In failing to follow its written procedures in 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, the Department has
reason to believe NSTAR may be in violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 192:
“(a)  General.   Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of
written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and for
emergency response.”
49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a).
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List of Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Incident Report-Gas Distribution System, Form RSPA F 7100.1.
Exhibit 2: Statements by witnesses
2a Janet Webster statement to Department Investigator on July 26, 2003
2b: Janet Webster statement to Hopkinton Police Department on July 24, 2002
2c: Richard Maijs statement to Hopkinton Police Department on July 30, 2002             
    2d: Emily Webster statement to Hopkinton Police Department on July 30, 2002
2e: Matthew Webster Statement to Hopkinton Police Department on August 2, 2002
2f: Tara Carey state to Hopkinton Police Department on August 6, 2002
Exhibit 3: Hopkinton Police Department incident report narrative by Officer Patrick O’Brien
and Dispatcher Meaghan Deraad.
Exhibit 4: Hopkinton Fire Department Report.
Exhibit 5: Chronology of events by NSTAR Gas.
Exhibit 6: Photograph of squeeze-off tool installed on 3" plastic gas main installed below
Main Street, Hopkinton.
Exhibit 7: Engineering drawing of tie in of 3" plastic gas main to 4" steel gas main installed
below Main Street, Hopkinton.
Exhibit 8: Pressure charts from the regulator stations feeding the Main Street, Hopkinton
area.
Pressure print out for the regulator stations feeding the Main Street, Hopkinton
area from the Framingham Plant, Milford Regulator Station, and Hopedale
Regulator Station. 
Exhibit 9: Engineering drawing for the service line to 65 Main Street, Hopkinton installed
June 30, 1947. (Note:  address changed from 79 Main Street to 65 Main Street,
date of change unknown.)
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Exhibit 10a: Engineering drawing of 1/2" plastic service line installed, from the curb cock to 
to the basement of  65 Main Street, Hopkinton, October 8, 1974. 
  10b: Engineering drawing of 1/2" plastic service line installed, from the main to the
curb cock, October 25, 1979, for 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. 
Exhibit 11: Letter from Department investigator to NSTAR Gas dated June 16, 2003
Exhibit 12: Letter from NSTAR to Department investigator, dated July 7, 2003.
Exhibit 13: Incident investigation report by Richard C. Wallace, for 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton, dated July 24, 2002.
Exhibit 14: Photograph of collapsed structure, 65 Main Street, Hopkinton, July 24, 2002.
Exhibit 15: Photograph of debris scattered onto Main Street, Hopkinton. 
Exhibit 16: Photograph of the demolition of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. 
Exhibit 17: Photograph of service line penetration through basement wall, 65 Main Street. 
Exhibit 18: Photograph of dead weight tester and pressure chart.
 
Exhibit 19: Photograph of pressure gauge showing a test pressure of 58 psig. 
Exhibit 20: Summary Table of NSTAR visits to 65 Main Street, Hopkinton between June
2001 and June 2002.
 20a: Work order number 0102-72545 dated June 6, 2001.
 20b: Work order number 0202-96521 dated February 22, 2002.
 20c: Work order number 0203-55159 dated March 6, 2002.
 20d: Work order number 0203-55717 dated March 6, 2002.
 20e: Work order number 0203-82806 dated March 12, 2002.
 20f: Work order number 0207-53676 dated May 23, 2002.
 20g: Work order number 0207-53683 dated May 23, 2002.
 20h: Work order number 0207-58312 dated May 24, 2002.
 20i: Work order number 0207-59243 dated May 24, 2002.
 20j: Work order number 0208-44930 dated June 4, 2002.
 20k: Work order number 0208-44930 dated June 5, 2002.
 20m: Work order number 0208-54895 dated June 5, 2002.
Exhibit 21:  Annual business district walking survey dated January 10, 2002
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Exhibit 22: Mobile leakage survey daily activity report dated July 2, 2002.
Exhibit 23: Business District Survey for Hopkinton town center dated July 15 ,2002.
Exhibit 24: Odorant reports from NSTAR Gas, January through August, 2002.
Odorant test taken July 24, 2002, in the area of 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. 
Exhibit 25: Statement by William E. Leathem III, NSTAR Gas.
Exhibit 26: Map of distribution system. 
Exhibit 27: Opinion letter from Office of Pipeline Safety, dated September 12, 2003.
Exhibit 28: Announcement of Protocol for testing of evidence from 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton.
Exhibit 29: Protocol for the testing of evidence from 65 Main Street, Hopkinton. Table II
from Massachusetts Materials Research, Inc. Report dated December 4, 2002.
Exhibit 30: Revised Protocol for testing of evidence from 65 Main Street, Hopkinton, dated
December 31, 2002.
Exhibit 31: Photographs of Inner-Tite transition fitting removed from 65 Main Street,
Hopkinton.
Exhibit 32: Photograph of an exemplar. 
















































































































































MMR photo of Inner-Tite transition fitting sections and
an intact exemplar of the same vintage. 
65 Main Street, Hopkinton
July 24, 2002 
